In a paper called Definiteness and Knowability, Timothy Williamson investigates the question of whether one must accept that vagueness is an epistemic phenomenon if one adopts classical logic and a disquotational principle for truth. Some have thought that one must not, and have argued that classical logic and the disquotational principle can be preserved without accepting that vagueness is an epistemic phenomenon 1 . Williamson's paper, however, finds 'no plausible way of substantiating that possibility'. Its moral is that 'either classical logic fails, or the disquotational principle does, or vagueness is an epistemic phenomenon' 2 . The moral of this paper, on the contrary, is that there is a plausible way of substantiating that possibility. The plausible way in question looks like a view that Williamson dismisses at the beginning of his paper, and that others regard as unworthy of serious consideration. The view is that when the ascription of truth or falsity to a sentence is affected by unclarity, there is no such thing as what the sentence says.
It is important to distinguish between borderline objects and borderline situations, because there is no reason to think that they must always go together. It may certainly be plausible to say that -given the due qualifications -whenever a borderline situation arises, a borderline object is involved. But the converse doesn't seem to hold. Borderline objects do not necessarily make borderline situations. For example, the fact that A is 1.75 m does not entail that whenever 'A is tall' is assertively uttered, problems of evaluation arise. It is easy to imagine cases in which the sentence is assertively uttered yet no unclarity affects the evaluation of the assertion. Suppose that A is the teacher of a class of kids, and that one of them assertively utters 'A is tall' in order to explain to another why A is able to write on a part of the board they can't reach. In this case no problem of evaluation arises, in that we take the assertion to be correct. Similarly, it is easy to imagine situations in which 'A is tall' is assertively uttered and we take the assertion to be incorrect. This happens for example if the sentence is uttered by someone who is seriously considering A's chances to join a basketball team 3 . In the literature, the two understandings of 'borderline case' are often mixed. This is why it is quite common to talk as if whenever (and just because) a borderline object is involved, a borderline situation should arise. And given that borderline objects are roughly as numerous as paradigmatic objects, this amounts to talking as if borderline situations were roughly as numerous as unproblematic situations. But such talk is just a theoretical habit that takes us very far from our intuitions as ordinary speakers. In reality, it almost never happens that a speaker assertively utters a sentence and we don't know how to evaluate the assertion. For example, it almost never happens that someone assertively utters a sentence containing 'tall' and we don't know how to evaluate the assertion. We usually take for granted some way of understanding the sentence according to which either the assertion turns out clearly correct or it turns out clearly incorrect. Borderline situations almost never arise. As a matter of fact, borderline objects are correctly or incorrectly described this or that way depending on the occasion 4 . The second clarification concerns the expression 'what is said'. Roughly, what is said by uttering a sentence on a certain occasion depends on how the words occurring in the sentence are interpreted on that occasion, where interpreting a word involves understanding its linguistic meaning and specifying its reference in the context of utterance. This leaves room for at least two distinct intuitions. One is that, when a speaker assertively utters a sentence, there is something that he or she has in mind. For example, one speaker may use the sentence 'he is there' to convey the information that I'm in Turin, while another may use it to convey the information that I'm in St. Andrews. A natural way to express this difference is to say that the two speakers have different things in mind when they utter the sentence. That is, they mean or want to communicate different things. Accordingly, there is an un-derstanding of 'what is said' -call it the intentional understanding -on which what is said by uttering a sentence on a certain occasion is a matter of what interpretation of the sentence can rightfully be ascribed to the speaker on that occasion. The other intuition is that when a speaker assertively utters a sentence, there is something to which truth or falsity can be ascribed. The something in question is naturally understood as a specification of the reference of the words occurring in the sentence such that, according to it, either the sentence describes things as they are or it describes things as they are not. For example, if I'm in St. Andrews then 'he is there' turns out true if 'there' refers to St. Andrews, and false if 'there' refers to Turin. Accordingly, there is an understanding of 'what is said' -call it the truth-conditional understanding -on which what is said by uttering a sentence on a certain occasion is a matter of what interpretation makes the sentence evaluable as true or false on that occasion, where the interpretation is constrained by what the speaker has in mind. It is a naive temptation to put the two intuitions together. This amounts to thinking that, when a speaker assertively utters a sentence, there is one thing that is both the interpretation that can rightfully be ascribed to the speaker and a specification of the reference of the words occurring in the sentence that makes it evaluable as true or false. The term 'proposition' owes much of its popularity to the presumption that we need a name for such a thing. Contrary to this temptation, in what follows it is assumed that the two intuitions diverge to some extent. That is, what a speaker has in mind in assertively uttering a sentence may not amount to a specification of the reference of the words it contains that makes it evaluable as true or false 5 .
2. The line of thought of the paper may now be sketched by saying that borderline situations are cases in which there is no such thing as what is said in the truth-conditional sense. A good example of borderline situation may illustrate. Suppose that the grandmother is in the kitchen and the cat is in the living room in such a position that half of its body lies on the mat and the other half lies on the floor. Suppose that she makes a guess and assertively utters the sentence (1) the cat is on the mat Apparently, it is hard to tell whether the assertion is correct or incorrect, because it is hard to tell whether the word 'on' that occurs in (1) applies to the cat and the mat. This is not simply due to the fact that the cat is in the position described. It is easy to imagine cases in which (1) is uttered and the cat is in the very same position, yet no problem of evaluation arises. Imagine that the cat got muddy in the garden, and the mat is brand new and very expensive. The grandmother could be concerned about the mat, and wonder whether at least part of the body of the cat lies on it. Or imagine that it is winter and the floor is cold. The grandmother could be concerned about the health of the cat, and wonder whether its whole body lies on the mat. In other words, the case involves a borderline object, namely, the pair formed by the cat and the mat so positioned. But borderline objects do not suffice to make borderline situations. On the assumption that there are cases in which the two intuitive notions of what is said do not coincide, this can be regarded as one of them. The grandmother has something in mind. But what she has in mind does not amount to one specification of the reference of the words occurring in (1) that makes (1) evaluable as true or false. Whether (1) is true or false depends on whether or not the pair formed by the cat and the mat belongs to the extension of 'on'. Now the extension of 'on' can be specified both in such a way as to include the pair and in such a way as not to include it. As the two "alternative" situations imagined show, neither of the two possibilities is ruled out by the linguistic meaning of 'on'. This is to say that there are ways of interpreting 'on' according to which (1) is true, and ways of interpreting 'on' according to which (1) is false. The point is that what the grandmother has in mind does not "decide" between interpretations of the first kind and interpretations of the second kind. That is, what she says in the intentional sense does not uniquely determine one thing said in the truth-conditional sense.
3. The case of the grandmother may be accounted for in terms of underspecification. Let the actual interpretation of a sentence be what the speaker has in mind in uttering the sentence, that is, what is said in the intentional sense. Let a sufficiently specified -in short, ss -interpretation of a sentence uttered on a given occasion be an interpretation that is specific enough for the purpose of ascribing truth or falsity to the sentence on that occasion. What is said in the truth-conditional sense is a ss-interpretation. Accordingly, a case of underspecification may be defined as a case in which the actual interpretation does not amount to a ssinterpretation. The case of the grandmother is a case underspecification, in that there are at least two ss-interpretations of (1) that go "beyond" its actual interpretation, in the sense of not being uniquely determined by it. The account can be phrased in more formal way. Let a valuation be a classical interpretation. For example, in the case of (1) a valuation assigns an object to 'the cat', another object to 'the mat', and a set of pairs to 'on'. Valuations amount to what supervaluationists call "precisifications", that is, ways of making language precise. A valuation is admissible when it corresponds to a legitimate way of making language precise, that is, when it respects certain constraints imposed by the linguistic meaning of the expressions of the language 6 . Truth on a valuation is defined as usual. So (1) is true on a valuation if and only if the pair formed by the objects assigned to 'the cat' and 'the mat' belongs to the set assigned to 'on'. Interpretations are sets of valuations. The actual interpretation of a sentence as it is used on a certain occasion is a set of admissible valuations that is determined by what the speaker has in mind on that occasion. Let us stipulate that two valuations V 1 and V 2 overlap on a sentence s when they are alike as far as the truth or falsity of s is concerned. An interpretation of s is a ss-interpretation just in case it is a set of admissible valuations that overlap on s. Truth relative to a ss-interpretation is defined in terms of truth on a valuation. Let a be a ssinterpretation of s. Then s is true relative to a if and only if s is true on all the valuations V such that V OE a. Similarly, s is false relative to a if and only if s is false on all the valuations V such that V OE a. The distinction between normal cases and cases of underspecification is as follows. Let an interpretation a be compatible with an interpretation b if and only if a Õ b. A normal case is one in which there is a unique ss-interpretation that is compatible with the actual interpretation, namely, the actual interpretation itself. By contrast, a case of underspecification is one in which there are at least two ss-interpretations that are compatible with the actual interpretation and deliver opposite truth values. To see this, suppose that the actual interpretation a of s is not a ss-interpretation. Then, there are at least two valuations V 1 and V 2 that do not overlap on s and are such that V 1 OE a and V 2 OE a. It follows that there are at least two ss-interpretations b and g that deliver opposite truth values for s and are such that b Õ a and g Õ a, i.e. {V 1 } and {V 2 }. Inversely, if there are at least two ss-interpretations b and g that deliver opposite truth values for s and are such that b Õ a and g Õ a, then a is not a ss-interpretation. For if we take a member V 1 of b and a member V 2 of g, we get that V 1 OE a and V 2 OE a, although V 1 and V 2 do not overlap on s.
4. The underlying thesis of the account is that truth and falsity apply to sentences relative to ss-interpretations. This can be read in two ways, depending on how 'what is said' is understood. If it is understood intentionally, the thesis is that the things we say are evaluable as true or false only relative to ss-interpretations of the sentences that we utter to say them. Instead, if it is understood truth-conditionally, the thesis is that the things we say are ssinterpretations of the sentences that we utter to say them. Although there seems to be no reason to assume that one of the two understandings of 'what is said' has theoretical priority upon the other, or should be regarded as the correct one, here the second understanding will be adopted to show how the thesis squares with ordinary talk about assertions and their evaluation. Two intuitions distinctly emerge from ordinary talk about assertions and their evaluation. One is that there are cases in which a speaker assertively utters a sentence and we take the assertion to be correct. The other is that there are cases in which a speaker assertively utters a sentence and we take the assertion to be incorrect. These two intuitions can be phrased in terms of attribution of ss-interpretations to speakers. Let the condition of attribution be as follows for an interpretation a and a speaker S: a can be attributed to S just in case only a is compatible with the actual interpretation manifested by S. The cases of the first category are cases in which a ss-interpretation can be attributed to the speaker, and the sentence uttered is true relative to it. Similarly, the cases of the second category are cases in which a ssinterpretation can be attributed to the speaker, and the sentence uttered is false relative to it. The case of the grandmother belongs to neither of these two categories. Assuming that one asserts what one says, it is a case in which no unique thing is asserted. This can be construed in two ways. One option is to say that more than one thing is asserted, in that more than one ss-interpretation is compatible with the actual interpretation. The other is to say that nothing is asserted, in that no ss-interpretation can be attributed to the speaker. This second option is intuitively more appealing. First of all, it is quite implausible to describe a speaker as saying both something true and something false at the same time. Secondly, although it is quite sensible to assume that any thing said in the truth-conditional sense is a ss-interpretation, there seems to be no reason to grant in addition that any ss-interpretation is something said in the truth-conditional sense. For example, any set containing one admissible valuation is by definition a ss-interpretation of (1). But we wouldn't describe any such set as something said by the grandmother. Independently of which construal is adopted, however, the important thing about the case of the grandmother is that it is a case in which no ss-interpretation can be attributed to the speaker. The problem concerns attribution, it is not primarily a problem of truth and falsity. There is an obvious sense in which underspecification is compatible with the principle of bivalence, according to which truth and falsity are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive truth values. It is the sense in which bivalence holds relative to ss-interpretations. By definition, for any ss-interpretation a of a sentence s, either the valuations that belong to a are all such that s turns out true or they are all such that s turns out false. This entails two claims. One is that either s is true relative to a or s is false relative to a: truth and falsity are jointly exhaustive. The other is that it cannot be the case that s is true relative to a and s is false relative to a: truth and falsity are mutually exclusive 7 .
5. So far it has been argued that the case of the grandmother is a case of underspecification. Since the case of the grandmother is clearly a borderline situation, this entails that at least some borderline situations are cases underspecification. However, it does not entail that all borderline situations are cases of underspecification. The stronger claim can be justified as follows. From §4 it turns out that no problem of evaluation arises if the actual interpretation of a sentence is a ss-interpretation. Let C be a case in which S assertively utters s and a be the actual interpretation of s manifested by S. Now suppose that a is a ss-interpretation. Given that bivalence holds relative to ss-interpretations, s is either true or false relative to a. If s is true relative to a, then a ss-interpretation relative to which s is true can be attributed to S. This means that we take the assertion to be correct, hence that no problem of evaluation arises in C. Similarly, if s is false relative to a, then a ss-interpretation relative to which s is false can be attributed to S. This means that we take the assertion to be incorrect, hence that no problem of evaluation arises in C. Therefore, if a is a ss-interpretation then no problem of evaluation arises in C. Given that by definition C is a borderline situation only if some problem of evaluation arises in C, we get that if a is a ss-interpretation then C is not a borderline situation. It follows that if C is a borderline situation then a is not a ssinterpretation. That is, underspecification obtains in all borderline situations. We saw in §3 that if a is not a ss-interpretation, there are at least two ss-interpretations that are compatible with a and deliver opposite truth values for s. Therefore, the claim that underspecification obtains in all borderline situations entails that if C is a borderline situation then there are at least two ss-interpretations that are compatible with a and deliver opposite truth values for s. A fortiori, it entails that if C is a borderline situation then there are admissible valuations that deliver opposite truth values for s. This amounts to a presuppo-sition that is at the core of semantic theories of vagueness, namely, that borderline situations are cases in which the linguistic meaning of the words occurring in the sentence does not settle the question of whether the assertion is correct or incorrect. For example, a case in which a speaker assertively utters the sentence 'A is tall' and we don't know how to evaluate the assertion is a case in which the meaning of 'tall' rules out neither the possibility that the assertion is correct nor the possibility that it is incorrect. According to semantic theories of vagueness, the kind of unclarity that is characteristic of borderline situations depends on the linguistic meaning of the words occurring in the sentences we utter. The argument above shows that this holds in that it is a necessary condition of borderline situations that the linguistic meaning of the words occurring in the sentence uttered leaves indeterminate whether the assertion is correct or incorrect. On the other hand, the assumption that borderline situations involve problems of evaluation entails that such indeterminacy is not a sufficient condition of borderline situations. The linguistic meaning of 'on' and the fact that the cat is in such a position that half of its body lies on the mat and the other half lies on the floor do not suffice to make the situation borderline. The same goes for the linguistic meaning of 'tall' and the fact that the height of A is 1.75 m. In order to have a borderline situation we need three ingredients: the linguistic meaning of the words occurring in the sentence, the state of affairs, and the actual interpretation. The first two do not suffice.
6. The account of borderline situations outlined contradicts Williamson's disjunctive moral. In the first place, it is easy to see that borderline situations pose no threat to classical logic. For they involve no violation of bivalence. In the second place, the account preserves the disquotational principle. Assuming that truth and falsity apply to sentences relative to ssinterpretations, there are two ways of stating the principle. One is to phrase it as a schema that holds for sentences as they are actually interpreted, and involves ascription of truth relative to ss-interpretations. That is, for any ss-interpretation a, the following biconditional is true relative to a:
is true if and only if p
Here 'p' is a substitutional variable, and 'true' is a predicate whose extension varies with a. Borderline situations do not affect the principle, in that the only trouble they give concern the choice of a. The other way is to phrase the principle as a schema that holds for ssinterpreted sentences. For any a, let 'p a ' stand for 'p' as it is interpreted according to a. The following biconditional is true simpliciter: . In the third place, the account does not entail that vagueness is an epistemic phenomenon. According to epistemicism, in borderline situations the meaning of the words occurring in the sentence determines a truth value for it. In the case of the grandmother, this amounts to saying that the extension of 'on' is such as to make (1) true or false. The idea is that words have sharp boundaries, but we don't know exactly where these boundaries lie. Thus 'on' has sharp boundaries: given any cat an any mat, either the pair formed by them belongs to its extension or it doesn't. The fact is that we don't know exactly the borders of that extension, hence it may happen that we don't know, of a certain cat and a certain mat, whether or not the pair formed by them belongs to it. The account outlined says nothing like that. According to it, truth and falsity apply to (1) relative to ss-interpretations, so only relative to this or that ss-interpretation the extension of 'on' is such as to make (1) true or false. Given that borderline situations are cases in which there is no such thing as "the" correct interpretation, there is no such thing as "the" interpretation that makes (1) true or false. This means that there is nothing to be ignorant of.
7. Showing that there is a coherent view that preserves classical logic and the disquotational principle but differs from epistemicism would not be enough if the view were implausible. For mere coherence does not justify acceptance. This is what Williamson seems to think of a view that looks pretty much like that outlined in the previous sections:
At least one view does combine classical logic and (T+) with the denial that vagueness is an epistemic phenomenon in a way that seems at any rate not formally inconsistent. This is the view that vague sentences do not say that anything is the case, in borderline cases if not elsewhere. Thus, if 'b' is a borderline case for 'bald', to say 'b is bald' or 'b is not bald' is to make an utterance without propositional content. One says nothing by uttering either sentence, so neither is true. Thus, the corresponding antecedents of (T+), in 'in c "b is bald" says that P' and 'in c "b is not bald" says that P', fail whatever legitimate substitution is made for 'P', and (T+) holds vacuously. For the same reason, (T) would have no relevant instance. Thus, there would be no relevant true sentence, and therefore nothing for speakers of the language to be ignorant of. […] No attempt will be made here to argue against that extreme view. Many of the philosophers who wish to accept orthodoxy while denying that vagueness is an epistemic phenomenon are willing to instantiate (T) with vague sentences even in borderline cases. They allow that 'b is bald' is true if and only if b is bald; 'b is bald' says that b is bald, even if b is borderline for 'bald' 9 . 8 (T3) provides an argument against the hypothesis -whose plausibility is called into question in §4 -that borderline situations are cases in which more than one thing is said. As it is shown in Andjelkovic and Williamson 2000, pp. 225-226, (T3) entails a principle of uniformity to the effect that everything said by a sentence on a certain occasion has the same truth value: Here (T+) is a principle equivalent to (T3), (T) is the disquotation schema, and 'orthodoxy' stands for the combination of classical logic with (T). On the assumption that Williamson's talk of borderline cases is to be understood in terms of borderline situations, the account outlined in the previous sections seems to fit his description. Why is it judged 'extreme'? The apparent motivation is that an utterance of 'b is bald' in a borderline situation wouldn't have propositional content. As a consequence, (T) wouldn't be instantiated, and hence we couldn't say that 'b is bald' is true if and only if b is bald. This judgment is too rash. It is certainly plausible that an utterance of 'b is bald' in a borderline situation has propositional content. The obvious sense in which it does is that in which some interpretation of the sentence can rightfully be ascribed to the speaker. In other words, such a case is different from one in which, say, 'he is there' is written on the board to make a point of grammar. However, the view does not entail that 'b is bald' lacks propositional content in this sense. For this sense amounts to the intentional understanding of 'what is said', and the view grants that on that understanding something is said. What it denies is simply that the sentence has propositional content in the truth-conditional sense 10 . Similarly, it is plausible that (T) is instantiated with sentences uttered in borderline situations, as it is quite natural to say that 'b is bald' is true if and only if b is bald. But again, the view does not deny it. The disquotational principle can be phrased in terms of a schema -(T1) -that holds for sentences as they are actually interpreted, and these obviously include sentences uttered in borderline situations. In substance, the view is not extreme, and perhaps some attempt should be made to argue against it. To appreciate its plausibility, it is important to distinguish it from another view that is indeed extreme, namely, that according to which only precise expressions have meaning, so whenever we utter a sentence containing vague expressions we say nothing at all
11
. What the account of borderline situations requires is simply that that there are cases in which we say nothing sufficiently precise. This is perfectly compatible with there being cases -the normal ones -in which we say sufficiently precise things. For example, even if there are cases in which 'on' is interpreted in such a way as to say nothing sufficiently precise by uttering (1), most of the time 'on' is interpreted in ways that are sufficiently precise for the descriptive purposes that guide our use of the sentences containing it 12 . This is not to say that most of the time 'on' is interpreted in a completely precise way. Our ways of interpreting it almost never involve complete specification of its extension. Rather, they involve a partial specification of it, in that the only "part" of extension that matters on each occasion concerns the objects that are salient on that occasion. This is to say that the use of a predicate on a given occasion determines a set of valuations, namely, the set of all the valuations that share the part specified. For example, if one uses (1) to describe a certain cat and a certain mat, one takes the extension of 'on' to include the pair formed by the cat and the mat in question. But there can be another pair such that it is left indeterminate by that use whether or not it belongs to the extension of 'on'. Therefore, that use determines a set that includes at least two valuations: one is such that the extension of 'on' includes only the first pair, the other is such that the extension of 'on' includes both. In this sense, sufficient specification is a property that belongs to the interpretation of a sentence relative to the state of affairs that the sentence is intended to describe on this or that occasion. If we call completely specified an interpretation that provides for all possible cases, then sufficient specification does not mean complete specification. A completely specified interpretation would amount to a single valuation rather than to a set of valuations.
8. We saw how borderline situations can plausibly be described in accordance with the thesis that truth and falsity apply to sentences relative to ss-interpretations. This section shows that the thesis provides a straightforward solution to the old problem of the sorites. In its original form, the sorites says that if the removal of one grain from a heap always leaves a heap, the successive removal of every grain still leaves a heap. The argument can be phrased as follows:
(2) 1000 grains make a heap (3) for every n, if n grains make a heap then n -1 grains make a heap _______________________________________________________ (4) 0 grains make a heap The inference from (2) and (3) to (4) seems valid, (2) and (3) seem acceptable, but (4) seems unacceptable. Therefore, it is natural to think that there is something wrong with the argument. To provide a solution to the problem of the sorites is to say what exactly is wrong. The thesis that truth and falsity apply to sentences relative to ss-interpretations points to the following definitions of validity and soundness. An argument is valid if and only if, necessarily, every ss-interpretation that makes its premises true also makes its conclusion true. The notion of validity involved is the classical one, namely, that according to which validity is necessary preservation of truth. But since the premises of an argument can be true only relative to ss-interpretations, their truth can be necessarily preserved only relative to ssinterpretations. Similarly, an argument is sound relative to a ss-interpretation if and only if it is valid and all its premises are true relative to that interpretation. The notion of soundness involved is the classical one, namely, that according to which a sound argument is a valid argument whose premises are true. But since the premises of an argument can be true only relative to ss-interpretations, they can all be true only relative to ss-interpretations. These two definitions tell us what is wrong with the sorites. The argument is valid, just as it seems. For given any ss-interpretation of 'heap', necessarily, if (2) and (3) are true relative to it then (4) is also true relative to it. However, there is no ss-interpretation that makes the argument sound, as there is no ss-interpretation relative to which (3) is true. This is easily seen as follows. A ss-interpretation of (2) and (3) is an interpretation relative to which truth or falsity can be ascribed to (2) and (3). Since (3) is equivalent to a list of conditionals, the interpretation must allow ascription of truth or falsity to each of the conditionals in the list, hence it must allow ascription of truth or falsity to the antecedent and to the consequent of each of the conditionals in the list. This entails that for each of the collections of grains featuring in the series that goes from 1000 to 0 grains, it has to be specified whether or not it is a heap. Therefore, a ss-interpretation of (2) and (3) is an interpretation according to which there is a cut-off point in the series, that is, there is a number n such that a collection of n grains belongs to the extension of 'heap' while a collection of n -1 grains does not belong to it. The sorites draws its initial plausibility from the fact that we normally use 'heap' without specifying its extension as required by (3). Thus, (2) seems acceptable in that 'heap' is normally interpreted in such a way that a collection of 1000 grains belongs to its extension. Similarly, (4) seems unacceptable in that 'heap' is normally interpreted in such a way that a collection of 0 grains does not belong to its extension. But these interpretations do not involve complete specification of the extension of 'heap'. In particular, they do not involve a delimitation of that extension sensitive to differences of one grain. Normally, when we interpret 'heap' in such a way that a collection of n grains belongs to its extension, we do not have in mind a specification which prescribes that a collection of n -1 grains does not belong to it. Therefore, we are apt to exclude that a collection of n grains is a heap but a collection of n -1 grains is not a heap. This is why (3) seems acceptable. In other words, what makes the existence of a cut-off point for 'heap' counterintuitive is that we normally do not specify such a point. Whenever we use the word to describe a certain object, we take for granted that no cut-off point lurks in the vicinity of that object, namely, that other relevantly similar objects may equally be described that way 13 . 9. This last section explains how the account outlined differs from similar accounts that are already on the market. First of all, the fact that the account outlined contradicts Williamson's moral makes it significantly different from standard supervaluationism. For standard supervaluationism does not contradict that moral. The initial idea of supervaluationism is that the vagueness of natural language consists in its capacity in principle to be made precise in more than one way. In accordance with this idea, the theory provides a method that enables us to deal with many different ways of making natural language precise -many different precisifications of it -and collect them into one semantic description. The method is that of "supervaluations". A supervaluation is an assignment of truth-values that rests on a quantification over assignments of truth values relative to precisifications. A sentence is "supertrue" if it is true on all precisifications, "superfalse" if it is false on all precisifications, 13 Assuming that the use of 'heap' on a certain occasion is guided by what is psychologically salient on that occasion, this means that in normal circumstances no cut-off point is located within the area of salience. However, it does not mean that a cut-off point exists but is located somewhere outside that area, as suggested in Raffman 1994 or Graff 2000 . Supposing that there is a cut-off point outside the area of salience is no less puzzling than supposing that there is one within that area. On this I agree with Priest 2003, p. 15. and neither otherwise. Supervaluationism identifies truth with supertruth. This is why it makes Williamson's moral true. In the first place, supertruth does not conform to the disquotational principle. For if a sentence is true on some precisifications and false on others, the biconditional obtained by plugging the sentence in the disquotation schema is not supertrue 14 . In the second place, supertruth violates bivalence, and hence classical logic. Moreover, as it has been emphasised by its critics, supervaluationist logic fails to preserve certain classical principles about consequence and rules of inference. This is due to the supervaluationist definition of validity as necessary preservation of supertruth, that is, the definition on which an argument is valid just in case necessarily, if its premises are supertrue then its conclusion is also supertrue 15 . The account outlined shares with supervaluationism its initial idea. It is plausible to say that a vague language is a language that can in principle be made precise in more than one way. This is captured by the assumption that a sentence allows different admissible valuations. However, the account outlined differs from supervaluationism in that it does not identify truth with supertruth. Truth relative to a ss-interpretation conforms to the disquotational principle and does not violate bivalence 16 . Moreover, the account outlined has no problem with consequence and rules of inference, in that it does not involve a supervaluationist definition of validity. The latter says that an argument is valid just in case, necessarily, if its premises are true on all precisifications then its conclusion is true on all precisifications, whereas the definition offered in §8 says that an argument is valid just in case necessarily, for all ss-interpretations, if its premises are true then its conclusion is true. The difference between the two definitions may be seen as a difference in the scope of the quantification over precisifications or ss-interpretations 17 . A stronger affinity ties the account outlined to the non-standard version of supervaluationism advocated by Van McGee and Brian McLaughlin. The version in question is nonstandard in that it does not identify truth with supertruth. McGee and McLaughlin claim that a distinction must be drawn between "truth" and "definite truth", where the former is defined in accordance with the disquotational principle and classical logic, while the latter is characterized by using a supervaluationist model-theoretic apparatus. Given that the characterization of definite truth is not epistemic, the view is like the account outlined -and unlike standard supervaluationism -in that it contradicts Williamson's moral 18 . But some important differences remain. In the first place, it is not clear whether the actual interpretation as understood here plays some role in the determination of definite truth. McGee and McLaughlin say at a certain point that 'the thoughts and practices of the speakers of the language, together with the nonlinguistic facts, pick out a set of sentences as 14 See Keefe and Smith 1997, pp. 33-34. 15 Here I follow Williamson 1994, pp. 146-153 . The problem concerns supervaluationism in its standard version. But other definitions might be adopted. See Keefe 2000 and Varzi on this point. 16 The simple fact that truth relative to a ss-interpretation is defined in terms of a quantification over valuations does not mean that it is a form of supertruth, at least not in the sense that matters here, namely, that in which the supervaluational apparatus allows for a third status between supertruth and superfalsity. 17 The distinction is spelt out in Williamson 1994, pp. 147-148, Keefe 2000, §3, and Varzi. 18 McGee and McLaughlin 1995. Williamson 1997, however, questions . However, it is not clear whether this entails that what a speaker has in mind on a certain occasion contributes to the determination of what counts as a definite truth on that occasion. If the question of whether a sentence is definitely true on a certain occasion does not depend on what the speaker has in mind on that occasion (although it may depend on the thoughts and behaviour of the linguistic community as a whole), then the unclarity that affects the evaluation of (1) is independent of what the grandmother has in mind. If so, the view must be that (1) is neither definitely true nor definitely false simply because the linguistic meaning of 'on' and the position of the cat are as they are. But this amounts to saying that borderline objects suffice to make borderline situations, contrary to what is assumed in §1 20 . In the second place, even supposing that McGee and McLaughlin do take into account the actual interpretation, or that their view may be adjusted in such a way as to take it into account, an important difference remains. When McGee and McLaughlin talk of truth and definite truth, they seem to have in mind what is said in the intentional sense, whereas here the bearer of truth and falsity is what is said in the truth-conditional sense. This is in part a matter of focus. The account outlined could be phrased in terms of the intentional understanding of 'what is said'. Its main thesis would be that the things we say are evaluable as true or false relative to ss-interpretations of the sentences that we utter to say them, and borderline situations would be described as cases in which the speaker asserts a unique thing that is not evaluable. This would not substantively differ from saying that what is asserted in borderline situation is neither definitely true nor definitely false, given that 'evaluable' would mean 'evaluable as true or false'. However, there is one important respect in which the difference is not simply a matter of focus. McGee and McLaughlin attribute truth and falsity simpliciter to what is said in the intentional sense. This entails that in borderline situations the sentence uttered is true or false simpliciter. By contrast, even if the account outlined were phrased in terms of the intentional understanding of 'what is said', such attribution would be ruled out by its main thesis. Another view in line with the rejection of Williamson's moral has recently been advocated by Cian Dorr. Dorr describes a situation that looks very much like the case of the grandmother. A questioner cannot see a glass, and asks to a respondent 'Is the glass pretty full?' The respondent can see the glass just well enough to know that it is between 60% and 70% full, and hence is strongly motivated not to answer 'yes' or 'no'. Dorr explains that it would be misleading to answer 'yes' or 'no', because the questioner's credence in some important true propositions, such as the proposition that the glass is between 60% and 70% full, would be substantially lowered, and this is the sort of result that the respondent wants to avoid. So no ignorance is involved, contrary to what epistemicism contends, but rather a disposition not to mislead. According to Dorr, this situation is paradigmatic of the sort of questions posed by vagueness. Such questions involve a semantic indeterminacy that is to be understood in terms of convention. Roughly, a sentence is semantically indeterminate if neither it nor its negation is determinately true, where 'determinately true' is defined as be-ing permitted by the conventions constitutive of the language, and its negation being forbidden by such conventions. Dorr claims that this notion of determinate truth opens the way for an account in the style of supervaluationism, but adds that the supervaluationist identification of truth with supertruth and of validity with preservation of supertruth is to be rejected as suggested by McGee and McLaughlin 21 . The account outlined differs from Dorr's view in at least two important respects. In the first place, the willingness of a speaker not to mislead other speakers plays no role in it. Dorr seems to think that all borderline situations can be accounted for in terms of such willingness. But this not very convincing. Take the case of the grandmother. It is part of the situation described that no other speaker is in a position to mislead the grandmother, yet it is evident that the situation is borderline. We don't know how to evaluate the assertion, and obviously we are not in a position to mislead the grandmother. One may certainly imagine another case in which a speaker is in a position to mislead the grandmother -a friend of her could be in the living room just in front of the cat -and contend that the explanation of our case is parasitic on that of a case of the latter kind. For example, one may claim that in our case we think "as if" we were that speaker 22 . But it is not obvious why cases of the latter kind should have explanatory priority upon cases like ours, given that they could as well be explained in terms of cases like ours. For example, the willingness of the imagined speaker not to mislead the grandmother could be explained in terms of our incapability of evaluating the assertion. In the second place, the account outlined differs from Dorr's view for the role it assigns to the actual interpretation. In Dorr's view is even clearer than in McGee and McLaughlin's view that the unclarity affecting the evaluation of the assertion in borderline situations is not a matter of actual interpretation. What counts as a determinate truth on a certain occasion does not depend on what the speaker has in mind on that occasion, because it entirely rests on the conventions that are constitutive of the language. Thus in the case of the grandmother (1) is semantically indeterminate, in that both (1) and its negation are permitted, and hence neither of them is determinately true. As the same conventions hold for the two alternative situations imagined in §2, the view does not allow a distinction between the case of the grandmother and those situations. Again, this amounts to saying that borderline objects suffice to make borderline situations, contrary to what is assumed in §1.
